

Paris, 20 October 1998

MEMO N° 19 TO BERNARD CAZENEUVE

Ref: “**attack n° 2**” file

Dear Bernard

I am submitting to you a few “troubling” observations, subject to confirmation to be obtained from qualified experts.

- 1) The surface-to-air missiles featuring on the photos sent by the DRM seem to be **complete**, i.e. with the missile still present in the launcher, which would mean that they have not been used (the SAM 7s and 16s are “complete round” weapons: the launcher and the missile are packaged together, ready to use, and the weapon cannot be reloaded). If this fact is confirmed, this could not therefore relate to the weapons used against the Falcon 50. Why then would the military cooperation mission have decided to send these photos to Paris in the hours following the attack?
- 2) The reference numbers of the launchers provided (9M322) seem to correspond to “Strela 2” SAM 7s and not “Igla” SAM 16s, the Russian reference of which is 9K38. This detail may have no importance. But if it is confirmed that it relates to SAM 7s, perhaps we should ask for the list of Iraqi **SAM 7s** held by France (only a list of SAM 16s is provided)?
- 3) The letter from general Rannou dated 15 June 1998 officially confirms the presence on board the Falcon 50 of the usual two “black boxes”, a CVR (recorder of the team’s conversations) and a recorder of the on-board parameters. I do know whether their analysis “would not have been able to clarify the exact circumstances of the attack”, as General Rannou feels, but I observe that somebody thought it would be preferable to make them disappear. Which reduces the field of suspects to those who had access to the crash zone in the hours following the attack.

Best wishes

Jean-Claude Lefort