

GENDARMERIE  
Judicial Detachment  
Military Auditorat<sup>1</sup>  
Palais de Justice  
1000 BRUSSELS  
02/508.60.11

PRO JUSTITIA

On this day of 6 May, nineteen hundred and ninety-four at 0855  
We, the undersigned party Artiges Guy, warrant officer - OPJ<sup>2</sup>  
of the gendarmerie

In residence in Brussels – Military Auditorat

In civilian clothes (1)

Report. No. 652

Case:

report that I visited the neighbourhood of Reine Elisabeth in Evere,  
where we met and heard the following party at the above dates and  
time:

Count of:

Assassinations

Vincent

André, Jules, Alex

born in Ixelles on 07/10/1941

Domiciled at Chemin du Pachy 10 at

1328 Lasne

?

Hearing of Vincent

André

Colonel – Reg. No. 94689 –

CTM<sup>3</sup> mission chief in Rwanda.

[Continuation of] the  
dossier No. 02 02545  
C8 of the Prosecutor  
Serviceman in Brussels

Who declared to us:

“I wish to express myself in French.

With regard to the attack against the aircraft of the President of  
Rwanda, no rumours had been heard previously. This was a surprise  
to everyone.

Mr. Ver Elst-Reul

Afterwards, I received an item of information from the director of  
the Rwandan oil company (Société Générale des Pétroles) in  
Mwanza (Tanzania). This was a plot hatched by Hutu extremists,  
including soldiers, the chief of which was General Nsabimana.  
According to the same individual, President Habyarimana was aware  
of the existence of the plot, and knowing who was the mastermind,  
had obliged him to board his plane. The President had also ensured  
that he was accompanied by the President of Burundi in order to  
avoid an attack.

++STAMP++

MILITARY  
AUDITORAT  
BRUSSELS

09 MAY 1994

My personal conviction is that this was a Rwandan affair, intended  
to sink the Arusha accords.

(1) Cross out the  
inappropriate wording

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<sup>1</sup> A Belgian institution  
which combines the  
figure of Public  
Prosecutor with the War  
Council

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<sup>2</sup> OPJ – judicial police officer

<sup>3</sup> CTM – Military-Technical Cooperation?

To the extremists, these agreements meant the taking of power by the Tutsis in the medium term, which they absolutely wished to avoid.

To my knowledge, neither the FAR nor the FPR had ground-to-air missiles.

As individual arms, the FAR had Chinese AK-47s, FALs, South African R4s and German G3s. With regard to bayonets, they were traditional except for the Chinese gun, which had an in-built socket bayonet.

With regard to the '1000 Collines' radio, I can say that it is at the root of anti-Belgian feeling. The anti-Belgian campaign started towards the end of November 1993.

I never met Ruggiu, who, it seems, was very discreet and avoided contact.

With regard to the assassination of our 10 paratroops, I am unable to tell you anything since at the time I was in Tanzania.

I confirm the comments of Lt.-Col. Beaudoin in the sense that General Nsabimana and other high-ranking soldiers guaranteed that Arusha would not take place and that they were ready to thwart any action by the FPR.

On the airport, I had a discussion around 15/04/94 with Major Mutabera, who told me clearly that one had to understand them, that they had to apply the "final solution". He told me this after I told him that these massacres would not help them internationally.

I would also add that the anti-Belgian feeling had been developed by those who didn't want an Arusha accord. They thus wanted the MINUAR to leave in order to have a free hand.

For them, Arusha represented the taking of power by the Tutsis.

I cannot see that I have anything else to say for the time being.

(After reading, he remained and signed our information register).

In witness whereof.  
++SIGNATURE++