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N° 1210

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In the proceedings of:

DEWEZ Joseph  
MARCHAL Luc

- - - - -

On the ground of:

Failing to assist  
persons in danger

- - - - -

Subject:

Information

- - - - -

Drafted following  
marginal note n°  
0109/95 of 30/10/95  
issued by Judge  
Advocate General.

(sitting) Solicitor  
General fOBE

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ADVOCATE GENERAL

23 NOV 1995

On this day six November nineteen hundred and

ninety-four at 14.00 hours;

We the undersigned DEKONINCK Christian, Capt-Cdt-OPJ

of the gendarmerie,

in residence in Brussels - SPJJM in civilian dress;

Bring to the attention of the Advocate General that following the duty requested by his marginal note referred to in the margin of this document, we, on this day and at the abovementioned time, have studied the diary that Col MARCHAL handed to us during his hearing on 19 Oct 95 in our offices.

This log book consists of two notebooks, one green, relating to the period from 04 Dec 93 to 01 Apr 94 and the second notebook is yellow, relating to the period from 02 April 94 until 10 Jun 94. Reading both notebooks enabled us to establish the development of the political situation and, in particular the change in attitude of the population and the militias towards the Belgians, as well as the precursory signs making it possible to predict a deterioration of this situation.

We only found a few comments regarding the assassination of the 10 UN peacekeepers, and other initiatives or directives on the subject. During his hearing Col MARCHAL pointed out to us that with regard to the critical days of 06 and 07 the comments were made afterwards and are only sketchy.

We have subdivided our report into several parts, i.e.:

- a) the change in the political situation
- b) the attitude of the population and the militias towards the Belgians
- c) the precursory signs of the deterioration of the situation
- d) the events of 06 and 07 Apr
- e) the attitude of the 1 Para
- f) the behaviour of RUTBAT

For each subdivision we have highlighted the comments that seem to be of interest to us with reference to the day on which they were made.

In general the Colonel restricted himself to recording the events that marked the day and sometimes refers to his considerations regarding the change in the political situation, the situation of UNAMIR, the relations with foreign entities which make up his detachment as well as with the operational centre of EVERE.

### **A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION**

We have examined the Log Book of Col MARCHAL with regard to his comments relating to the development of the political situation in RWANDA. For this purpose, we have subdivided this study into three parts, i.e. the first which relates to the implementation of the demilitarised zone in a radius of 10 km around Kigali, the KWSA (KIGALI WEAPON SECURE AREA), the second, the implementation of the 'CLEAN CORRIDOR' operation and finally the setting up of a broad based transition government (BBTG).

In annexes A/1 and A/20 of this document we have repeated the full text written in the Colonel's Campaign Journal. The passages relating to the development of the political situation appear in italic letters.

#### **A. KIGALI WEAPON SECURE AREA (KWSA)**

On 13 Dec 93, Col MARCHAL reports that the start of the KWSA is fixed for 20 Dec 93.

The SOPs of the KWSA were fixed at a meeting held on 14 Dec 93 with the various Rwandan authorities concerned. The final adjustments of its directives were made on 16 Dec 93.

He records the anticipated start of the KWSA on 20 Dec 93, however, nothing is yet in place.

21 Dec 93 was the deadline for the signing of the SOPs, difficulties appeared both on the side of the FPR and also on the side of the FAR.

He records the blocking of the signing of the SOPs due to a differing interpretation of the ARUSHA agreements.

The start of the KWSA is fixed on 24 Dec 93 at 10.00 hours.

On 26 Dec 93 the Col went to the three camps in order to record the work of the UNMOs and establishes that the actual work of the KWSA would not commence until 27 Dec 93.

On 31 Dec 93, he had a discussion with the Minister of the Interior of the FPR who guarantees his intention to comply with the procedures of the KWSA.

On 04 Jan 94, he establishes the failure to observe the KWSA directives in the KANOMBE camp.

On 06 Jan 94 he draws up the first KWSA assessment.

On 12 Jan 94, he refers to a meeting for MDN with a view to reviewing the small KWSA implementation problems.

The Col refers to the preparation on 14 Jan 94 of an addendum to the KWSA SOPs.

He reports a disappointing meeting on 19 Jan 94 between the FPR and RGF regarding the KWSA.

On 29 Jan 94 a meeting took place relating to the lessons to be drawn after one month of KWSA.

On 31 Jan 94, the Col has a meeting with the President of the Republic during which the latter is informed of the results of the KWSA.

On 26 Feb 94, a double transfer of troops is suggested in order to have a more effective presence in the KWSA.

#### **B. CLEAN CORRIDOR OPERATION**

On 20 Dec 93, Col MARCHAL reports that the document has still not been signed and that under these circumstances he would incur serious risks by implementing CLEAN CORRIDOR but he is of the opinion that such risks should be taken.

He reports that the day of 25 Dec 93 is reserved for coordination meetings for CLEAN CORRIDOR.

On 27 Dec 93 the last coordination meeting took place.

The operation was implemented on 28 Dec 93 and occurred without problems. The entry in town is described as memorable and with an enthusiastic crowd, that at times was even delirious, which made the Col write that if some elements wanted to do damage he could not do anything about it.

C. BROAD BASED TRANSITION GOVERNMENT (BBTG)

On 31 Dec 93, Col MARCHAL reports that the BBTG should be sworn in but that this is still not certain.

On 01 Jan 94, the political situation is no clearer and the President of the Republic informed the Prime Minister that he was refusing to swear in the BBTG.

On 02 Jan 94, an ultimatum was issued by the FMI who threatened to turn off the tap.

The political situation is deteriorating and on 03 Jan 93 he refers to his fears of having to implement the CLEAN CORRIDOR operation in the other direction.

On 04 Jan 94 the preparations and coordination of the BBTG ceremony took place.

On 05 Jan 94, he reports numerous problems between FPR, Gd and PL. At the end of the day he found out that the SRSB had postponed the MEP BBTG.

On 07 Jan 94 a further BBTG MEP coordination meeting was held.

On 08 Jan 94, in the evening a briefing took place for the MEP of the BBTG the following day, but when returning in the evening at about 24.00 hours he found out from the FC that the ceremony would not take place this Sunday.

On 09 Jan 94 a meeting took place with the EM Gd Head in order to coordinate the action plans for the BBTG MEP ceremony.

On 24 Jan 94, the Colonel had a discussion with the designated Vice Prime Minister in the BBTG who, given the hold-ups, wanted the UN to impose a clause setting out the role of the President of the Constitutional Court in the MEP procedure for the transition institutions.

On 12 Feb 94, he records that the SRSB is accused of bias and that the BBTG is deferred indefinitely.

The Colonel mentions that since the morning of 19 Feb 94 they now only talk about the BBTG MEP for the following Tuesday.

On 20 Feb 94, the Rwandan MINAFET announced the date of the BBTG MEP on 22 Feb 94. Everyone seems to believe this date.

On 21 Feb 94, the Colonel finds out that ceremony will take place at the beginning of the afternoon.

On 22 Feb 94, he finds out that the BBTG MEP is arranged for the following day at 10.00 hours.

On 23 Feb 94, the arrangements are in place from 06.00 hours, but he soon establishes that the ceremony will not take place at 10.00 hours, but is initially postponed until 14.00 hours and in the end did not take place.

On 18 March 94, on the radio news at 08.00 hours, the designated Prime Minister announced the BBTG MEP for the following Monday.

On 22 Mar 94, the Colonel found out during a meal that the BBTG MEP would take place this Friday.

The information from the day before seems to be confirmed and the FPR have not issued any objection.

On 24 Mar 94, he has confirmation from the MINAFET that the ceremony will take place the following day.

On 25 Mar 94, arrives without the BBTG MEP following a problem of different lists between the one presented by the Prime Minister and the one presented by the President of the Republic.

On 27 Mar 94, the Colonel records that the BBTG MEP is not taking place today either.

On 28 Mar 94, it seems that at the request of the SRSB the BBTG MEP should take place at 08.00 hours. A further setback because it seems that this initiative was the personal initiative of the Prime Minister.

**B. THE ATTITUDE OF THE POPULATION AND THE MILITIA  
TOWARDS THE BELGIANS**

We have examined the Log Book of Colonel MARCHAL with regard to his comments relating to the attitude of the population and the militias towards the Belgians. For that purpose, we have subdivided this study into three parts, i.e. firstly, the description of the anti-Belgian climate that prevailed in RWANDA, secondly the fears expressed by Colonel MARCHAL regarding the success of the mission entrusted to the UN peacekeepers, thirdly the steps envisaged by the military authorities of the UN to reduce the risks incurred.

We have recalled in Annexes B/1 and B/20 of this document, the entire written text from the Colonel's Campaign Journal. The passages relating to the attitude of the population towards the Belgians, the fears expressed by Colonel MARCHAL and the steps taken by the various authorities appear in bold print.

A. Anti-Belgian slogans

From 08 Jan 94, Colonel MARCHAL highlighted the danger of relations deteriorating with the population, which was already causing anti-Belgian slogans to be heard in the mornings.

On 10 Jan 94, he reports that the targets of the preceding Saturday's demonstration was the BE Mil from the UNAMIR.

On 31 Jan 94, after the incident of the men of 1 Para with an important member of the CDR, an anti-Belgian party, he describes the attitude of Radio 1000 Collines which commences a crusade against the Belgians. He recalls on this occasion the fears expressed by the Ambassador of BELGIUM about actions of which the Belgians may be the victims.

It should be noted that Colonel MARCHAL asserts that the Judicial Secondment is following up the matter.

On 07 Feb 94, Colonel MARCHAL had serious indications, which seemed to confirm that the BE Det is the target of certain influential underworlds that were trying to discredit the Belgian participation and would lead, by the increase in problems, to the withdrawal of the Belgian UN peacekeepers.

On 09 Feb 94, he mentions that the Ambassador of BELGIUM considers that they should stand their ground recalling the obligations of all parties within the context of the ARUSHA agreements and that the act of blaming the Belgians by calculation is contrary to this ethos. He highlights the disinformation campaign by RTLM.

B. Fears

On 13 Dec 93, Colonel MARCHAL issued reservations with regard to the location of the HQ, located in an outlying place making it necessary to pass through a populated district that may prove dangerous in the event of unrest.

On 22 Dec 93, he expressed his fears and worries in relation to the uncontrollable reactions of the crowd at the time of the "CLEAN CORRIDOR" operation and following a spontaneous demonstration in favour of the FPR.

On 28 Dec 93, the Colonel expresses his fears faced with the lack of resources at his disposal in the event that the situation deteriorates significantly.

On 30 Dec 93, he expressed certain fears with regard to the continuation of the peace process.

On 01 Jan 94, he confirmed his fears with regard to the blocking of the political situation and records that in the coming days particular vigilance was required.

On 03 Jan 94, following contact with the Rwandan authorities, he anticipated a CLEAN CORRIDOR operation in the other direction as well as reinforcement of the tactical defence of the airport.

On 06 Jan 94 in the evening, the FC contacted him to tell him that a minister had informed him that they feared disturbances in the night.



On 08 Jan 94, he reported the possibility of UNAMIR compensating for the shortfalls of the Gd, in particular in the field of maintaining order. These fears were reinforced by the information he obtained, on 10 Jan 94, via an informer, a certain 'Jean-Pierre', an officer in the MRND militia, regarding the existence of arms and munitions depots as well as regarding the fact that UNAMIR was infiltrated and that consequently the Rwandan authorities were kept informed of the actions and movements of the UN. He was also informed of the fact that the militia were armed and equipped by the FAR, the EM Head of whom is the direct counterpart of the MRND President. He found out that his informer was responsible for the distribution of arms and the training of the militias.

On 13 Jan 94, he had the opportunity to see some of these arms and to make sure of the reliability of his informer.

On 14 Jan 94, he was worried about the possible use of arms against the soldiers of the BE Det.

On 15 Jan 94, he wondered what role he was supposed to play in the event of serious unrest and evacuation.

On 17 Jan 94, he recorded the request for additional information from JS regarding the arms caches.

On 18 Jan 94, he is informed by G2 of the fact that these arms have been distributed.

On 21 Jan 94, he realised that UNAMIR risks being the scapegoat in the event of the stagnation of the situation and the outburst of passion.

On 26 Jan 94, the Colonel records that UNAMIR had had a lot of luck and that the incident in the morning, shooting by the FPR on the demonstrators, could have taken a tragic turn.

On 31 Jan 94, he recorded the fears of the ambassador regarding the acts of which the Belgians were the victims.

On 04 Feb 94, he drew the attention of the Rwandan ministers to the danger of torpedoing UNAMIR and of the seriousness of the situation that would result from its departure.

On 07 Feb 94, the Colonel mentioned that an increasingly large number of serious signs seemed to confirm that the BE Det is actually the target of some underground movements which are trying to discredit BE participation and, by the increase in problems, to encourage the withdrawal of the BE Det.

On 10 Feb 94, he anticipates that if the situation persists the unrest will probably increase and he worries about the security of the BE soldiers.

On 28 Feb 94, he records that if the BBTG is not rapidly set up they are heading towards confrontation. This is confirmed by the observations made that indicate a reinforcement of defensive positions in the three main KIGALI camps.

On 02 Mar 94, he mentions that various rumours are being spread about the UNAMIR.

On 14 Mar 94, the Colonel is surprised by the calm that is prevailing even though the problems that led to the troubles at the end of February are still present.

On 19 Mar 94, he establishes that the BE Det is a target and will remain so for a long time because of the negative assessment of the action of the 1 Para.

On 23 Mar 94, he mentions rumours that herald paralysis of the country the following day with acts that may be violent.

On 05 Apr 94, he is worried again about the security conditions which prevail at "Check Points".

#### C. Anticipated measures

Colonel MARCHAL mentions measures that had been anticipated by him as well as by the Force to be able to exploit the information obtained, i.e. from 10 Jan 94, the dispatch of a coded message to NEW YORK with a view to obtaining the authorisation necessary to conduct offensive action to seize these arms.

On 11 Jan 94, already NEW YORK is requesting that further directives on the subject are awaited.

On 12 Jan 94, the Colonel records that FC said to him that NEW YORK was not ready to underwrite this case as it exceeds the mandate of the UNAMIR.

On 13 Jan 94, he had a discussion with the Ambassador of BELGIUM about the information of JP and expressed regret about the fact that it was a pity that he could not intervene and that NEW YORK had still not changed its position. On 14 Jan 94, the FC asked that Colonel MARCHAL formulated a request in his name for JP to be given the green light with the BELGIAN Embassy. After a discussion with the Ambassador he decided not to allow this request in order to guarantee the neutrality of BELGIUM within UNAMIR. On 21 Jan 94, he mentions suggestions made to define a new UN policy. He states that these options ought to be presented to the SRSG, which in turn, and depending on its choice, would pass them on to NEW YORK for a decision. On 22 Jan 94, the FC presented its options to the SRSG which made its own. He anticipated a reply from NEW YORK with directives on Monday. He confirms on 04 Feb 94, the negative reply from NEW YORK to the FC request to be able to carry out more offensive actions. On 09 Feb 94, he repeated this request for offensive action and pointed out that the Ambassador of BELGIUM enquired to find out if he should support this request by the FC. His reply is positive.

### **C. PRECURSORY SIGNS OF A DETERIORATION IN THE SITUATION**

We have examined the Log Book of Colonel MARCHAL with regard to his comments relating to the precursory signs making it possible to anticipate a deterioration of the situation. For this purpose, we have subdivided this study into four parts, i.e. firstly the list of the various incidents, secondly the factors that demonstrate the failure to observe the KWSA directives, thirdly the comments relating to drawing up an evacuation plan, which shows that a certain anxiety prevailed within the UNAMIR, and fourthly the precursory signs of the massacre of the Tutsis.

We have recalled in Annexes A/1 and A/20 of this document, the entire text written in the Colonel's Campaign Journal. The passages relating to the precursory signs of the deterioration of the political situation appear in underlined characters.

#### **A. Incidents**

On 05 Jan 94, Colonel MARCHAL records that an operation had been conducted with a view to finding the band leader who attacked two UNMOs. On 07 Jan 94, the Colonel is informed of an attack with weapons with blades in the houses opposite the FPR exit. On 08 Jan 94, he records firing from the FPR on one of our C130. On 11 Jan 94, he mentions an explosion in a booby-trapped car near the BELGIAN Embassy. However, it does not seem to have been a political attack. On 23 Jan 94, he records various incidents in several places in the town and at different times when firearms were used. On 26 Jan 94, following a demonstration organised by the inhabitants with a view to drawing attention to the growing insecurity, a member of the FPR fired a gun to make the demonstrators move back. On 30 Jan 94, he records many grenade explosions, just like the previous night during which several grenades exploded. On 31 Jan 94, about twenty grenades exploded, including one in the HQ sector.

On 22 Feb 94, the Colonel recalls the intervention of the JALI Company at about 07.00 hours on the BYUMBA road following shooting and explosions. He also records that Road Blocks had been installed. Following the lynching of the President of the CDR very violent incidents were reported in town. A curfew was established by the prefecture.

He records at about 22.00 hours numerous grenade explosions.

On 27 Feb 94, at the end of the afternoon, an UNAMIR Minibus was fired on near DON BOSCO. No one was injured.

#### B. Failure to observe the KWSA

On 30 Dec 93, Colonel MARCHAL records that the FAR do not want to remove the AML and that he was confronted at the camp mont KIGALI also has problems.

On 31 Dec 93, during a discussion with the Comd. of the Presidential Guard he records that the latter would like to reduce the level of armament of his men but that he had received the order to the contrary from on high.

On 02 Jan 94, he records at the end of the afternoon that at the CND the FPR is not complying with the application of the KWSA procedure.

On 04 Jan 94, he records the failure to observe the KWSA directives at the KANOMBE camp.

On 06 Jan 94, the Colonel has a discussion with the Comd Bn of the Presidential Guard about the over-arming of the President's escort, in total contradiction to the SOPs of the KWSA.

On 07 Jan 94, he met the KIGALI city prefect with a view to reducing police weapons and in this way to explaining the KWSA philosophy.

Within the context of the KWSA missions it is also important to demonstrate that since 09 Jan 94 Colonel MARCHAL had been informed that grenades were circulating among the population and, that on 10 Jan 94 he was informed of the existence of arms caches as mentioned previously.

On 10 Mar 94, he found out from the aerodrome monitoring team that the munitions were close to the AA canons and that one item was directed towards the CND.

#### C. Evacuation plan

From 08 Dec 93, contact was made with the staff of the BELGIAN Embassy with regard to the general security of the expatriates.

On 11 Jan 94, Colonel MARCHAL had a discussion with the chargé d'affaires from KENYA and with the military attaché from FRANCE who were worried about the attitude of the Belgian soldiers in the event of the evacuation of the expatriates.

On 15 Jan 94, he records a request for directives sent to COps in EVERE and in which he asks what role he should play in such an eventuality.

On 27 Jan 94 a meeting took place with the delegates from the Western Embassies during which the evacuation plan for the KIGALI sector was set out.

On 05 Feb 94, a coordination meeting took place for the Force. The FC records that the plan for the Force is not sophisticated enough and must be redrawn on the basis of the sector plan.

On 19 Mar 94, the Colonel records a meeting with the Ambassador of BELGIUM with regard to the security and evacuation plan of the expatriates.

On 23 Mar 94, he records the preparation for the briefing to be held with the French and relating to the UN Evacuation plan for expatriates.

On 24 Mar 94, the briefing took place regarding the evacuation plan given above all for the attention of the French.

On 05 Apr 94, the Colonel had a coordination meeting for the medical evacuation by C130 and notes that the evacuation plan is not yet finalised.



D. Murders of Tutsis

On 10 Jan 94, Colonel MARCHAL points out that his informer "Jean-Pierre" requests the protection of the UNAMIR in exchange for information on the arms caches. He gives the reasons for this request by the fact that Jean-Pierre was in agreement with making war on the FPR but he could not give his support to the actions aiming to identify and locate the Tutsis of the various sectors of KIGALI with a view to killing them.

On 23 Jan 94, he records that the militia set up barriers in town and created problems on the side of NYAMIRAMBO where the Tutsis were the subject of threats and attacks.

On 24 Jan 94, the Colonel had a discussion with the Vice Prime Minister of the FPR who told him that in the event of crimes against the Tutsis the FPR would react violently. He records that the deterioration of the current situation brings with it the start of this type of action.

The night of 30 Jan 94, many grenade explosions occurred. The Colonel presumed that they were acts intended to make certain Tutsis flee.

On 23 Feb 94, the Colonel mentions that some incidents of an ethnic nature were reported throughout the day, and that fear was instilled in the population. He records an increase in the number of calls for assistance.

**D. THE EVENTS OF 06 AND 07 APRIL**

We have examined the Log Book of Colonel MARCHAL with regard to its comments for the day of the attack against the aeroplane of the Rwandan President, on 06 Apr 94 and the day of the massacre of the 10 Belgian UN peacekeepers on 07 Apr 94. For this purpose, we have subdivided this study into two parts, i.e., the first for the events of 06 Apr 94 and the second for the events of 07 Apr 94.

We have recalled the entire text written by Colonel MARCHAL in his Campaign Journal in Annexes B/1 to B/20. The most critical passages have been highlighted and appear in bold characters.

A. 06 April 94

At 09.00 hours, Colonel MARCHAL attended a coordination meeting at the EM Gd to prepare the cordon and search operation for the following day.

At 11.00 hours, he records his movement to the KALI camp with a view to inspecting the camp and to patrol the zone. He establishes that several FAR positions do not apply the KWSA.

At 20.30 hours, he records large explosions heard in KANOMBE. Subsequently he found out that this was the firing of two missiles on the Rwandan President's aeroplane.

The Colonel refers to the start of a very long night full of uncertainties.

He attended a crisis meeting, chaired by the JS Gd.

He describes the calm of the night even though he senses the agitation at the barriers.

B. 07 April 94

For Colonel MARCHAL the night was calm until 05.30 hours when a radio announcement announced the tragedy of the day before which triggered a fury of gunshots and automatic weapons in all the camps. This shooting did not stop all day.

He records that the crossroads were occupied by GP, FAR and Gd units which meant his units had lost the freedom of movement.

The Colonel records that the Gd did not react with the same speed and the same intensity to send a maximum patrol as the UNAMIR.

The FC gives him the order to send a patrol to the crash site to commence an inquiry.

He records at 05.36 hours the placing on alert of the QRT of RUTBAT.

He is aware that at 07.00 hours the anti-aircraft units remove their munitions to KIA.

At 07.15 hours, the Lt Col BAVUGAMENSI from the Security company of the Gd informs him that two platoons of the GP were assassinating the opponents.

He said that at 08.40 hours his men who could not follow AGATHE, who was fleeing, were taken and disarmed and taken to the KIGALI camp.

He records at about 09.40 hours that the Tutsis were very probably killed by the GP.

At 12.00 hours he received the information from FC/MA, obtained by the Milob who was with the prisoners that 2 or 3 from the mortar pl had definitely been shot and probably 11.

At 16.00 hours he refers to the exit of the FPR from the CND and the violent attack against the GP battalion. Violent fighting ensued until nightfall.

The Colonel records the alarming moments when about fifteen men were surrounded by an angry crowd in the afternoon. They saved themselves by using their weapons.

### **E. ATTITUDES OF THE 1 PARA**

We have examined the Log Book of Colonel MARCHAL highlighting the attitude of the first Belgian detachment, the 1 Para, in its capacity as a sub unit of the UNAMIR. For this purpose we have subdivided this part into three parts, i.e. firstly the incidents caused by the personnel of the 1 Para, secondly a description of the general attitude of the unit and thirdly the comments made by Colonel MARCHAL regarding the shortfalls in respect of the unit command.

We have recalled in Annexes B/1 to B/20 of this document, each comment from the Colonel's Campaign Journal which attracted our attention by indicating the day on which these were made. The most critical passages appear in normal characters.

#### **A. Incidents**

On 31 Jan 94, Colonel MARCHAL recorded that some men from the 13 Company had an incident, the day before, with an important member of the CDR party.

On 06 Feb, he mentions the incident that Gen NSABIMANA was subject to at a check point which occurred in a rather discourteous manner.

On 04 Mar 94, he recorded that 4 men from the 21 Company were completely mad and broke in to 1000 Collines hotel.

On 05 Mar 94, a further incident with soldiers from 1 Para is recorded.

#### **B. General attitude of the Unit**

On 15 Dec 93, Colonel MARCHAL recorded a problem with the attitude of 1 Para who behaved triumphantly whereas he recommends openness towards the population with a view to creating a climate of trust.

On 27 Dec 93, he stigmatises the tourist attitude of the unit personnel who consider the "CLEAN CORRIDOR" operation to be a banal exercise.

On 28 Dec 93, he records that his bad impression from the day before is confirmed.

On 01 Feb 94, he gives information about the clear indecision by the FC regarding the inadequate reactions that the battalion may have in the event of engagement in more offensive action.

On 02 Feb 94, he reports a discussion he had with the French military attaché Colonel CUSSAC regarding the attitude of the 1 Para. He corroborated his thoughts. He considers that many soldiers have not managed to adapt their behaviour to the situation in KIGALI and still consider they are in SOMALIA. They have an aggressive, unsubtle and inappropriate attitude.

On 04 Feb 94, he records a new report by the French military attaché who records an unjustifiable and completely puerile attitude.

On 19 Mar 94, he reports his qualified feelings regarding the general behaviour of 1 Para which leaves a negative assessment which will handicap the action of the 2 Cdo.

#### C. The Unit Command

From 02 Jan 94, Colonel MARCHAL records that he concurs with the idea of the FC that the battalion is allowing the situation to deteriorate rather than to actually look for a solution.

On 04 Jan 94, he is persuaded that the 1 Para has not come to grips with the problem as needed and refers back to the superiors a little easily.

On 01 Feb 94, he mentions a telephone call from JSO who requests that the Comd of the 1 Para is informed of his concern with regard to the official report of command weakness.

On 02 Feb 94, he repeats that he attributes the responsibility for the bad behaviour of the 1 Para to its leader, LtCol LEROY who gives him the impression of not wanting to find remedies for the problems.

On 05 Mar 94, he confirms his impression that the 1 Para is a battalion that is not commanded.

### **F. THE BEHAVIOUR OF RUTBAT**

We have examined the Log Book of Colonel MARCHAL highlighting the problems encountered by the latter with the RUTBAT Detachment in its capacity as a sub-unit of the UNAMIR. For this purpose, we have subdivided this part into three parts, i.e. firstly the general behaviour of RUTBAT, secondly the satisfactory elements regarding their way of acting and thirdly the comments made by Col MARCHAL on an operational level about this Detachment.

We have recalled in Annexes B/1 to B/20 of this document, each comment from the Colonel's Campaign Journal which attracted our attention and indicating the day on which they were made. The most critical passages have been highlighted and appear in small capital letters.

#### A. General behaviour of RUTBAT

On 14 Dec 93, Colonel MARCHAL records contact with the entire Battalion.

On 26 Jan 94, he notes that the RUTBAT guard did not dare react, once again, and that as a result the UNAMIR bears a heavy responsibility in the incident.

On 27 Jan 94, he reports that during a check of the two RUTBAT activities, neither of them had been carried out.

On 30 Jan 94, he reports the arrival of the additional Battalion and of the personnel command. The entire personnel amount to 370 men.

On 08 Feb 94, he reports that the Bangladeshis do not share the same view of things as him.

B. Satisfaction with the RUTBAT behaviour

On 27 Dec 94, Col MARCHAL commented that the only ones to behave normally were the Tunisians and RUTBAT.

On 02 Jan 94, he records that RUTBAT carries out four patrols with a strength at 50% whereas KIBAT only carries out two patrols.

C. Operational capability of RUTBAT

On 09 Dec 93, Colonel MARCHAL reported his concerns with regard to the operational capability of RUTBAT and its ability to fulfil its role in the "CLEAN CORRIDOR" operation.

On 10 Dec 93, he records that the problems with RUTBAT are ongoing. This unit does not have any logistics backup.

On 20 Dec 93, he mentions the lack of mobility of RUTBAT.

On 12 Feb 94, he indicates that the RRT of RUTBAT has APCs but that these are not yet operational.

On 24 Feb 94, he recalls the mission for opening the route with the commencement of 6 APCs.

On 04 Mar 94, he attended a disassembly display of a Road Block and to protect VIPs with the APC. The result of the demonstration proved to be unconvincing.

On 05 Mar 94, he attended a further RUTBAT rehearsal. He records an improvement but states there is a lack of realism in relation to the situation that they have experienced over the last few days.

On 08 Mar 94, he attended a further rehearsal on the use of the APCs in a fraught situation. He does not make any comment.

On 02 Apr 94, at the request of the FC he drafted a memo on the operational limitations of RUTBAT.

Draft only

Whereof act

[signed]

1. 08 Dec 93  
15.00 hours Amabel meeting Mr. COLIN and Mr. FONTAINE regarding the general security of expatriates.
2. 09 Dec 93  
AM quite depressing with a few major problems:
  - PC 1 Para does not know where to go and place itself
  - **RUTBAT DOES NOT WANT TO MOVE BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF THE BN COMD ON 25 DEC**
  - **RUTBAT DOES NOT WANT TO TAKE WATCH AT THE FORCE HQ OR PATROL IN ITS SECTOR.****HOWEVER, I HAVE CONCERNS ABOUT THE OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY OF RUTBAT AND ITS ABILITY TO FULFIL ITS ROLE IN THE "CLEAN CORRIDOR" OPS**
3. 10 Dec 93  
**CONTINUATION OF THE PROBLEMS WITH RUTBAT. DOES NOT HAVE ANY SP LOG, HAD NOT BROUGHT A SINGLE WATER BOTTLE.**
4. 11 Dec 93  
**WELCOMING OF THE 2ND LIFT OF RUTBAT.**
5. 13 Dec 93  
Date of KWSA fixed for 20 Dec.  
End PM jump until Empl NW HQ. I am not particularly happy with the location, it is a long way from anything and outlying. Furthermore you have to cross a populated district which may prove dangerous in the event of unrest.
6. 14 Dec 93  
**08.00 HOURS CONTACT WITH RUTBAT. THE WHOLE BN WAS GATHERED SITTING ON THE GROUND, OFFICERS AND WARRANT OFFICERS ON A CHAIR IN A SINGLE ROOM. I SAID A FEW WORDS IN ENGLISH.**  
10.00 Hours meeting with:
  - MDN: BIZIMANA
  - Chief of Staff:
  - JS FAR: Col BEM NSABIMANA
  - JS Gd (Rep):
  - G3: LtCol BEM RWABALINDA
  - LO FAR → HQ UNAMIROn our side FC - KES - me  
It was a matter of confirming the KWSA SOP. The RW called into question the principle of the Ctl Weapons and Munitions. Furthermore, the FPR made known their various suggestions for the installation of its Bn.
7. 15 Dec 93  
I run 1 Para past PC and settle this problem of attitude. In fact, there is NO reason to behave triumphantly. The keyword must be openness towards the population. To create trust.
8. 16 Dec 93  
Finalisation of the SOP → KWSA.
9. 20 Dec 93  
Anticipated start of the KSWA. But nothing is yet in place.  
**RUTBAT HAS NO MOBILITY, the SOP's are still not signed and at the sector we come up against a lack of resources. Despite everything we are continuing the preparation for implementation, mainly from the side of the UNMO's, KIBAT and RUTBAT ARE CARRYING OUT CONTINUOUS PATROLS.**  
Be that as it may the deadline is past and the Doc is still not signed.  
Consequently it is clear that if we execute CLEAN CORRIDOR we cannot be unaware that we re taking serious risks. I think that it is what must be done, we must forge ahead.

10. 21 Dec 93

Today is the deadline for the signing of the KWSA SOP's. Everything should be sorted out for today and yet everything has become more complicated as the hours go by. The FPR did come back with the signed Doc, however it requested a last modification with regard to the security companies. On the other hand the FAR returned with their demand to increase the personnel with automatic weapons. This runs the risk of the FPR as a result re-issuing their demands.

11. 22 Dec 93

On the other hand the SOP's are still blocked by a divergent interpretation of the ARUSHA agreements with regard to the personnel of the Gd that are able to continue to officiate during the KWSA. The figure of 1800 is applicable for the disengagement/demob phase for the FAR and from the start of the KWSA for the FPR.

**At the time of the departure of the FPR delegation a spontaneous pro-FPR demonstration took place. This incident worries me and makes me fear reactions that are difficult to control during "CLEAN CORRIDOR".**

12. 24 Dec 93

Following the negotiations during the night, the start of the KWSA is fixed for 10.00 hours.

13. 25 Dec 93

Christmas 93, a day like all the preceding days. The day reserved for CLEAN CORRIDOR coordination with RGF - KIBAT - RUTBAT - UNMO'S - RPF.

14. 26 Dec 93

AM visit to 3 camps in order to take stock of the UNMO's work within the context of the KWSA. In fact, it should be noted that the actual work cannot commence until 27 Dec given the Christmas WE. Another observation with regard to the Gd, clear and precise directives about the implementation of the KWSA were given by the EMG Gd to the units.

15. 27 Dec 93

08.30 hours last coordination for "CLEAN CORRIDOR" + directives for the reinforcement of security of the CND.

Another observation that I must, unfortunately make is that the 1 Para seems no longer to be what it was. The sightseeing attitude of the personnel along the route gives me the impression that they consider "CC" to be a banal exercise. **THE ONLY ONES TO BEHAVE NORMALLY ARE RUTBAT AND THE TUNISIANS.** I have not been able to stop myself expressing my disappointment and my disapproval to Comd 1 Para.

16. 28 Dec 93

Moving off at 05.00 hours in the direction of MULINDI. What I see only confirms my bad impression of yesterday with regard to the 1 Para. No one on the route, weapons without official.

This places us at around 12.35 hours for the departure of the Mov. Everything happens for the best for everyone. People gather together sometimes to cheer the convoy. The service of the Gd is exemplary. At about 14.30 hours we entered the KWSA and then the much feared passage through the refugee camp went very well. The entrance to the town will be memorable for many people. An enthusiastic crowd waits for the convoy of 80 Veh which stretches over +/- 4 km. Total personnel who participate in the mission amount to +/- 1200 UN soldiers and 3600 Gd. **At certain times there was delirium in the town. I realise that if some factors wanted to cause damage we could not do anything about it.** The arrival at the CND occurred at about 15.30 hours in delirium. Press conference with the Chairman then all the installation problems for the Bn and the VIPs.

17. 30 Dec 93

PM the problems continue with the FPR, furthermore the FAR do not want to remove the AML and at the Mont KIGALI camp there are also problems with the Comd of the Camp. He is refusing to give the info anticipated and allow the weapons and munitions to be controlled. This problem is settled via G3 of the FAR.

**Furthermore, the ceremonies scheduled for today have not taken place, following the internal dissent of certain parties. This has resulted in a certain concern with regard to the continuation of the peace process.**

18. 31 Dec 93

11.00 hours interview with the Comd Presidential Guard regarding the problem of the armed soldiers in town. He reports that he was quite ready to reduce the level or armament of the men but that he had received directives from on high.

14.00 hours meeting with the Minister of the Interior of the FPR. Very constructive and very open, the Minister guaranteed his total collaboration and his willingness to comply with the KWSA procedures.

15.00 hours meeting at the FHQ summary of the political situation. In principle the BBTG should be sworn in tomorrow, but there is still no certainty.

19. 01 Jan 94

The political situation is no clearer, the President of the Rep has informed the Prime Minister by letter that he refused to swear in the BBTG. Consequently the ceremonies announced for 01 Jan have been postponed sine die, despite many conciliation attempts of the UNAMIR and of some Western Ambassadors, the situation has not eased. **I fear that if this situation persists for several more days we will witness an increase in tension in KIGALI and in the country. I think that we are going to have to be particularly vigilant in the hours to come.**

20. 02 Jan 94

The situation is still static, the President does not want to give way. However, he is up against it with the international community which commands that the transition is carried out failing which the FMI will turn off the tap. **THIS NIGHT KIBAT ONLY CARRIES OUT 2 PATROLS WHILE THE WHOLE BN RUBAT WITH 50% OF PERSONNEL CARRIES OUT 4.** It is difficult to know exactly how far we can go. The 13 Co must leave Notre-Dame de Citeaux today, despite the warning from the FC the 1 Para waited until the last deadline and must now react in a panic. All this is unpleasant and I concur with the point of view of the FC when he says that the situation is being left to deteriorate rather than finding a real solution. Gut reaction of the battalion which wants to move the Tr LC under the pretext that the personnel work for the sector. Finally PM move to CND. Obviously they put me on edge by always complaining about everything even though they are not in line from the point of view of the application of the KWSA procedure.

21. 03 Jan 94

Still no relaxation of the political situation. What seems to be blocking it at the moment is the lack of agreement within the PL and the MDR regarding the people to be put in place. The time that is elapsing is complicating the situation. **A deterioration in the situation in KIGALI should be feared. Given the current context the HQ is preparing the CLEAN CORRIDOR operation but in the other direction as well as the Def Tac of the airport.**

22. 04 Jan 94

PM visit to the KANOMBE camp in order to observe in person the problem of the Bn AA and the failure to observe the KWSA directives.

I remain persuaded that the 1 Para has not dealt with this problem as it should have done and turned to the superiors a little easily.

Similarly the preparation/coordination of the BBTG inauguration ceremony was dealt with in this way.

23. 05 Jan 94

Meeting at 04.30 hours at the PC 21 Company for a cordoning off operation. The objective is to take the leader of the band which attacked two UNMOs a few days ago.

PM also a great uproar at the CND where there is total confusion with regard to the conclusion or not of the BBTG MEP saga. At one time things seemed to turn bad between FPR and Gd. The Gd had stopped civilians and taken their access card to the ceremony. They did this in order to prohibit entry for them to the ceremony. It seems it was a manoeuvre by the President intended to prevent certain members of the FPR and also of the PL from attending the official taking of office, therefore, having a pretext for cancelling the ceremony. All afternoon was spent waiting, in vain, for a favourable conclusion to the day. We found out that the SRSg had postponed, adjourned the meeting of BBTG MEP.

24. 06 Jan 94

Day devoted to contacts with various authorities. The full programme of the first weeks and the events of the last few days have not allowed me to make contact with civilian and military officials. Furthermore, the first days of experiencing the KWSA already make it possible to track an initial assessment and to amend the approach.

10.00 hours meeting with the Bn Comd of the Presidential Guard regarding the over-arming of the President's escort in complete contradiction to the SOPs of the KWSA.

**In the evening the FC contacted me to tell me that a minister had informed him that disturbances were expected during the night.**

25. 07 Jan 94

08.00 hours meeting with the Prefect of the city of KIGALI which proves to be an officer with whom I had done my final 2 years of university. The goal is to make contact and explain the philosophy of the KWSA and request the reduction in the level of police arms. The principle did not pose a problem but the practical fulfilment does not seem so easy, given the mission of the police and the fact that the Adm does not even have a truncheon to replace the gun.

13.30 hours coordination meeting for the MEP ceremony of the transition bodies. Evening dinner with the EM Gd Head together with the CMBCTM (Rw) and the Comd (Rw) of the KIGALI sector. Very nice to establish working relations. During the meal, via MOTOROLA, we were informed of a knife attack in the dwellings right opposite the FPR exit and that the ceremony on the following day was postponed.



26. 08 Jan 94

The day started with the announcement of a demonstration which continued until 13.00 hours. Hundreds of the demonstrators armed with batons and machetes prevented traffic to the meridian roundabout and to the "Chez LANDAU" crossroad. The aim being to prevent the members of parliament who should have gone to the CND. No Gd intervention which set an ultimatum at 13.00 hours. **This demonstration was orchestrated by someone because attendance was far from being spontaneous. This makes you think of the lack of ability that we have to oppose this type of action. Even the Gd gives the impression of not wanting to intervene. This attitude is worrying because in the eventuality of such a demonstration at the time of the inauguration ceremony the fear is that things will not occur as anticipated.**

PM meeting at the FHQ during which the immediate prospects were broached and in the event of the impossibility of the BBTG MEP. The eventuality is anticipated that the lack of effectiveness of the Gd may have to be compensated.

**This would imply that we take action against the crowd to maintain order. Such action even if it is imposed within the context of the BBTG MEP risks compromising our relations with the population which already in the morning had issued anti-Belgian slogans.**

A major incident could easily occur within this context. Without any prior coordination the C-130 crew wanted to participate within the context of organised demonstrations. It flew low and passed at least twice above the CND and the FPR Bn. An FPR gunman opened fire twice on the c-130.

In the evening briefing with a view to the MEP operation for the following day, but on returning at about 24.00 hours, I found out from FC that the ceremony would not take place this Sunday.

27. 09 Jan 94

07.30 hours meeting with EM Gd Head in order to coordinate our plan of action for the BBTG MEP ceremony. Very interesting discussion during which the Gen explained his concept of the Gd intervention. He is not for confrontation that inevitably leads to losses especially as there are a large number of grenades in the population.

28. 10 Jan 94

The memorable fact is the meeting with "Jean-Pierre" an officer from the MRND militia who had agreed to show us the place where the 135 weapons and munitions are stored in exchange for security for him and his family (6 people). His motivation is that while it is a question of fighting the FPR he is in agreement, but since he has been given the directive to identify and locate the Tutsis in the various sectors of KIGALI he realised that it was a question of murdering innocent people and he was no longer in agreement with that. He is responsible for the distribution of weapons and training the militia. He has a stock of Kalashnikovs and has already distributed 110 weapons including 35 with munitions. During the demonstration of last Saturday the appointed targets were the BE soldiers of the UNAMIR. As there was no confrontation with the BE. JP did not have had the opportunity to give the order to open fire. He said that he received orders directly from the MRNI President and that his direct correspondent is the EM Head of the FAR. The equipment and the Weapons with which the militia is equipped come from the FAR. He reports also that the UNAMIR has been infiltrated and that he is aware of all the acts and movements of the UN. He claims that he can bring the guns to where we want without a great problem and that he knows how to recover part of the weapons already distributed.

As the party "given a green light" has completely by passed me I reported to the FC which, after analysis, decided to refer it to NY in order to obtain its viewpoint and if necessary its action to undertake the operation. This must be carried out on Wednesday 12 Jan at dawn. I go back to the hotel while G2 prepares a coded message to NY.

29. 11 Jan 94

**In reply to this message NY requests that nothing is undertaken without further directives. These will only arrive at the earliest at the end of the afternoon, it is clear that nothing can be prepared today or carried out tomorrow.**

AM conversation with chargé d'affaires from the KENYAN Embassy, come with news of the Evacuation Plan for expatriates. Given the situation in KIGALI he is worried for the Kenyan community. Subsequently it was the turn of Col Gd (FR) CUSSAC the military attaché who by making contact was in fact informed of the directions that the BE from the UNAMIR were going to give in certain domains. One matter concerned him in particular, the attitude of the BE in the event of the evacuation of the expatriates. I reassured him by saying that if we had to stay I would stay even if it means changing beret.

At about 19.30 hours I was contacted by JP who told me that he had been sent for at 15.00 hours in order to receive directives for action to be organised in the coming days. We agreed to arrange a meeting tomorrow evening. Information reached us that a demonstration would be organised the following day but without indication as to the place and the objectives. With regard to the Gd they seemed to be unaware of anything. Bizarre. JP confirms that as far as he is aware nothing is planned.

**In the middle of the afternoon we were told of an explosion in a booby-trapped car close to the BE Embassy. It was an Electragaz company car. Did it run on gas? No one injured and the Eq EOD went to the incident.**

30. 12 Jan 94

09.00 hours meeting for the MDN with Dir of Cab, JS FAR, JS Gd, there G3, LO FAR, Gaspard and KES. The object being to review the minor implementation problems of the KWSA.

**14.00 hours interview with FC in order to debate the position of NY within the context of the JP affair. NY is not prepared to cover this file which departs from the UNAMIR mandate.**

31. 13 Jan 94

11.00 hours press conference meeting at the Prefecture with Prefect BENZAHO, FC, JS Gd, CIVPOL Head. Aim: to have a dialogue with the magistrates, to respond to their questions and those of the journalists. In fact the magistrates are mainly preoccupied by the security aspects confronted with banditry and hope that the UNAMIR is going to resolve the problems to a great extent. The information is lacking because they are not very well aware of what the UNAMIR can do and what it must not be used for.

**PM visit to the Ambassador in order to finalise the situation and inform him of the contact with JP.**

**19.00 hours interview with JP. Very constructive because he agrees to go and show the positions of the caches on the return route.**

**The case seems more and more decisive and with the clues in our possession it seems a shame not to be able to intervene. NY has still not changed its position. JP gives us at the maximum until Tuesday to intervene at the MRND office. After this time he does not guarantee that the weapons will still be there.**

32. 14 Jan 94

08.00 hours meeting at the FHQ with FC for a review following the last contact with JP. Even if it seems that we increasingly effectively define the military aspect in the matter of MRND arms caches, the political implications of possible military action are less and less easy to assess. In fact anything is possible. However, I think that the disadvantages on the whole outweigh the advantages that we can expect. **The only point that causes a problem for me is the possible use of these arms against the BE Det soldiers. During the meeting the FC requested that a request for a green light was made explicitly in its name for JP and his family to Amabel.**

PM preparation for the addendum to the KWSA SOPs. At 16.00 hours ended prematurely at FHQ given the absence of FC.

33. 15 Jan 94

Nothing in particular regarding the Operations plan. The political situation has not changed, on the other hand the economic and social situation demonstrates a few creaks. Since yesterday there has been a strike in water and electricity distribution. It is the first time since my arrival. Could this be connected with real social problems?

I forwarded to the COps a request for directives in the event of evacuation.

**I want to know officially the role that I am supposed to play in the event of serious unrest and evacuation: should I keep my UN beret or if the situation requires do I have a mandate from the EMG to act as a Belgian soldier? The reply is requested ASAP.**

34. 16 Jan 94

A single point to be reported is the MRND meeting at the NYAMIRAMBO stadium. The crowd was at the meeting and as JP had implied everything was happening in a spirit of order and calm. This meeting had gathered several thousands of soldiers (4 to 5,000) quite a lot of which have come from the interior of the country. This significantly contrasts with the few hundred of demonstrators of Saturday 08 January last. It will be interesting to follow the implications of this meeting which resembles general mobilisation.

35. 17 Jan 94

The reasons for the meeting are not clear. There have been no mobilisation slogans with a view to possible action in the next few days. However, the worrying factor, MUKENZI of the PL with HABYARIMANA tendencies has highlighted the ethnic divide. This is quite irresponsible talk at the present time.

**Telephone call from JS requesting some additional information about the arms caches. He wanted to know my assessment of the situation with regard to an armed intervention on the caches. In particular he insisted on my opinion regarding the FC having perhaps concerns regarding its way of managing this problem.**

36. 18 Jan 94

**Incidentally G2 reported to me that JP had told him that the arms had been distributed on Sunday evening.**

37. 19 Jan 94

09.00 hours meeting with the sub-prefect of the city of KIGALI, Mr. BUTER, in order to finalise an agreement relating to the demonstration exclusion zone of 1.5 km around the CND. Despite an exchange of opinions no sort of agreement was reached.

10.00 hours KWSA meeting with FPR-RGF disappointing because everything is subject to dispute and discussion. You have the feeling that you are not making progress. The situation is very clear, the KWSA negotiations imply the MEP of the transition institutions in succession after the arrive of the FPR Bn. The Bn is in place but not the institutions or the structures supposed to debate all the problems of everyday life. We are in fact facing a legal vacuum with regard to the ARUSHA peace agreements and we realise that it is not easy to act within this context.

18.30 hours the information is given that the ceremony will not take place.

38. 21 Jan 94

*Day identical to the previous day nothing has changed in the political situation. It is obvious that the longer this state of indecision persists the more sensitive the situation becomes. The points of view are moving further apart, the other parties are tending towards shameful intentions, the political parties hurl abuse at the command. All this is not designed to diffuse the situation.*

**The risk is quite real even if it is the UNAMIR that pays the price for the current stagnation. On one hand it is already blamed for the fact that the BBTG is still not in place, but also if things become very heated. It is quite clear that the scapegoat has already been found. Consequently in order to try to resolve the situation, the UNAMIR must take matters in hand and define options that may constitute a new UN policy, like for example the halt of the build up or placing all the available resources under Comdt KIGALI sector in order to maintain the status quo in the KWSA. In any event the options should be presented to the SRSG which in its turn and depending on its decision would pass them on to NY which would make a decision.**

39. 22 Jan 94

**FC confirms that he has presented his options to the SRSG which has made them its own. We could expect directives from NY from Monday. The political situation must in any event be resolved otherwise this will become no longer be credible.**

40. 23 Jan 94

*Dead calm until the end of the afternoon.*

Following the blocking of an INTERHAMWE by the Gd, the militia has put up barriers in town and created quite a lot of problems in NYAMBIRAMBO where the Tutsis were the subject of threats and attack. Similarly in "Chez LANDO" unrest also occurred. A man wounded by several bullets was transported to FAYCAL where he died. A car passed in front of CND and 3 shots were fired in the direction of the FPR. At about 23.30 hours several shots were fired from MERIDIEN, 5 in total in the space of 15 minutes.

41. 24 Jan 94

*09.00 hours meeting at CND with Mr. BIHOZAGARA, Vice Prime Minister designated in the BBTG who had said he wanted to have an overview of the problems with me. His reason was undoubtedly to make me aware of the perception that the FPR has of the current situation hoping I would pass it on to BRUSSELS. I retain from this meeting that the FPR fears that the same situation that prevails in several African countries will recur in RWANDA. They give the impression of playing the Democracy card but the same people as before are pulling the strings. This thought occurred to him because since the signing of the ARUSHA agreements, the President had not ceased dividing the opposition parties and thereby strengthening his position as arbitrator. On the other hand, in the case of crimes of which the Tutsis are the victims, the FPR does not hesitate to react violently. However, the deterioration of the current political situation sows the seeds for this sort of action. Finally, the FPR would like the UNAMIR to adopt a firmer attitude and since there is a blockade, the UN should impose the application of the clause setting out the role of the President of the Constitutional Court in the MEP process of the transition institutions.*

42. 25 Jan 94

09.30 hours discussion with the Minister of the Interior MUNYAZEZA Faustin regarding the demonstration ban zone of 1.5 km around the CND.

He expressed his concerns regarding the role of the UNAMIR in relation to that of the Gd and the local Police.

43. 26 Jan 94

At about 08.30 hours a demonstration started near the FPR exit of the CND. The aim of this demonstration organised by the inhabitants is to draw the attention of the authorities to the growing insecurity in the district. A few vehicles were stopped and placed across the road to stop the traffic. A shot was fired by the FPR to make the demonstrators move back.

**At about 10.30 hours an FPR armed escort made an exit, passed the portcullis at the side and reached the "Chez LANDO" crossroads. This escort fired several shots twice. The second time the Gd fired back. Fortunately this was a canon that fired in the air. Following this incident I went to the CND in order to assess the situation.**

**OBVIOUSLY THE RUTBAT GUARD, ONCE AGAIN DID NOT DARE TO REACT AND THE UNAMIR BEARS A DE FACTO HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY IN THIS INCIDENT.**

The incidents of this morning are symptomatic of the deterioration in the situation. We have had a lot of luck because this incident could have turned to tragedy.

44. 27 Jan 94

08.30 hours meeting about the evacuation plan with the western embassy delegates. The evacuation plan as conceived for the KIGALI sector was explained to them.

**PM MONITORING OF 2 RUTBAT ACTIVITIES, NEITHER OF THE 2 HAD BEEN CARRIED OUT. OBVIOUSLY THIS TYPE OF THING OCCURS REGULARLY WITH THEM.**

45. 28 Jan 94

**19.30 HOURS DINNER AT RUTBAT, ON THE OCCASION OF THE VISIT OF THE EM HEAD TO THE BANGLADESH DET.**

46. 29 Jan 94

AM spent in various meetings including the brain storming about the instruction and recommendations to be made following a month of KWSA. Interesting exercise from which a few usable ideas were drawn. It is obvious that the working method must be somewhat adapted given the insignificant results that were obtained.

47. 30 Jan 94

From 20.00 hours once again many grenade explosions. Just like last night during which several grenades were exploded.

**22.00 HOURS ARRIVAL OF ADDITIONAL RUTBAT AND OF THE COMD BN PERSONNEL COL NAZUL. RUTBAT TOTAL: 370**

48. 31 Jan 94

Last night about 20 grenades definitely exploded, including one in the Sector HQ. They were Chinese hand grenades. All these explosions were intended to make certain Tutsis flee. These grenades were thrown so that there were no victims, but to instil fear. It was, however, strange to hear explosions all the time? some clearly made more noise than others.

At 15.55 hours a phone call informing me that the President was expecting me at 16.00 hours. I had a very pleasant 1-hour meeting with him. He was informed of the KWSA results. Worrying about the many incidents over the last few days, asking if we could do something.

The evening was occupied by the consequences of the incident caused by a few men from the 13 Company yesterday. **Unfortunately the injured person is a big wig in the CDR, the thoroughly anti-Belgian party. The reaction was not expected on Radio 1000 Collines which is ready to initiate the crusade against the Belgians. The Ambassador fears actions of which the Belgians would be victims.** To sum up the fear of war has set in. **The Jud Sec is following the case.**

49. 01 Feb 94

**11.00 hours meeting with the Ambassador regarding the incident with Mr. BARAYAGWIZA, Director of foreign policy at MINAFET, and also an influential member of the CDR, a party which does not hide its anti-Belgian feelings.**

16.30 hours meeting at MINAFET for the excuses session. It is clear that this incident is ridiculous and regrettable and will have repercussions on the way in which we are perceived. This is true for the BE Det, but also for the UNAMIR. Without dispute this Det is in the wrong. After the meeting at the end of which the Dir of the Police seemed to appreciate my approach?!? I did my report to FC. This has been very critical for the Bn, saying that it was not up to a PKO and that in the event of more offensive action he would hesitate to engage it, because everything makes him fear that the unit has inadequate reactions. I confess that I was shaken by this point of view and that I was not very happy to hear this. FC asked me to draft a detailed document recording all the incidents that had occurred since the start of the KIBAT presence. FC spoke of action towards SRSG.

20.30 hours telephoned to JSO who asked me to inform the Comd 1 Para of his concern about what seemed to be a weakness as far as Comdt Bn is concerned. He is not very happy about this incident and especially about its implications. On the other hand he also asked me to watch out for certain officers who overtly flaunt themselves with the RW. This is prejudicial to the reputation of the BE.

50. 02 Feb 94

11.00 hours meeting with French military attaché Col CUSSAC regarding the attitude of our people at the time of a CP. What he explained to me unfortunately corroborates all the other information in this respect. There are many people who have not managed to adapt their behaviour to the situation in KIGALI and believe they are still in SOMALIA. An aggressive, unsubtle and inappropriate attitude. At the beginning of the afternoon I had a discussion lasting 1.30 hours with André LEROY about all the incidents, regarding the point of view of the FC, that of JSO and mine. I personally think I am not to blame. I made the comments that were called for from the start, I commented that it had gone too far and that ultimately I had to send a written document to express my disapproval.

Everything that happens is the responsibility of the commander who has never given me the impression of wanting to redress things. The feeling that I often felt, I retain: the Para uses more energy organising socio-cultural activities than organising the smooth running of its operational mission.

51. 04 Feb 94

Further report regarding the reprehensible conduct by the members of KIBAT. This report was sent to me by Col CUSSAC, the French military attaché. Again it concerns an unjustifiable and completely puerile attitude.

*15.00 hours meeting with Head EM Gd. We broached the current news points. This conversation was very interesting and throws "plausible" light on the positions that are favourable to the UNAMIR of MININTER and MINADEF, yesterday at the Prefecture meeting. These positions are due to an intervention of the Gd (JS) attracting the attention of the ministers to the danger of torpedoing the UNAMIR and of the seriousness of the situation that would be the result of the departure of the UNAMIR.*

*Regarding the request for cordoning operations the Gd wants to think about this for a while in order to be quite certain that there is no hidden agenda.*

**End of PM debriefing to FC who had received a negative reply from NY to the request to be able to carry out more offensive actions.**

*On the other hand the Rwandan authorities request the UNAMIR to carry out this type of operation. If we do not carry them out we are definitely going to lose all credibility.*

52. 05 Feb 94

10.00 hours coordination meeting regarding the evacuation plan. The Force plan does not set out the evacuation plan for expatriates, the preliminary updating recording the Sec Gen's report speaking about the Protection of the expatriates had the effect of a small bomb. But the effect was accomplished and the FC requested F3 to inform NY that the Force is going to include the expatriates in the evacuation plan. Following the various comments and our report is clearly more detailed than the others the FC realised that the Force plan should be more detailed and the DFC also realised that the F3 should construct its plan from the upgraded sector plan.

53. 06 Feb 94

At about 09.00 hours a telephone call from Gen NSABIMANA head of EM FAR telling me that he had stopped in a CP and that he had been treated discourteously. The explanation given by the non-commissioned officers who were at the CP, Lt NEES and Sgt VANDERHAEGEN is quite different. In fact the EM Chef did not want to be checked and had the crowd as a witness of what insult the Belgians made him suffer. Following these repeated incidents calling into question the top echelons (MDN, NSAMIMANA, BAGOSORA, SERUBUGA daughter) I took the decision to momentarily suspend the CPs for KIBAT to have a part taken over by RUTBAT and to increase the frequency of the daytime and night time patrols. I informed the FC of this decision by memorandum.

54. 07 Feb 94

*The night was calm. The trend towards stabilisation is confirmed. However, it is impossible to assess the political scope of this "truce". On the other hand more and more serious incidents seem to confirm that the BE Det is in fact the target for certain influential militias which are trying to discredit BE participation and by the increase of pullback problems of our Det. The number of incidents over the last few days in which KIBAT has been involved seems to confirm our assumptions.*

*PM important political meeting at FHQ with SRSG, FC and the political parties.*

55. 08 Feb 94

The meeting, which was described by the SRSg as the last chance meeting ended at about 01.30 hours and will continue on Thursday morning. No significant results, the only positive point is that people are talking. This meeting will be extended within the PL which is going to try to pick up the pieces and present a single list.

**END OF MORNING I WENT TO SEE A RUTBAT CP. THIS DID NOT RESSEMBLE ANYTHING AND WAS NOT OF ANY USE EITHER. IN FACT WE DID NOT CHECK ANYTHING AT ALL.**

**UNDOUBTEDLY THEY WILL HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH THE POPULATION OR CERTAIN AUTHORITIES**

PM discussion with DF who unconditionally no longer wants the sector to provide the protection for the FPR exit. This really perturbs him. I do not know whether it is as he says because the situation is ambiguous or because RUTBAT is fearful for its security. **THE BANGLADESHIS DO NOT HAVE THE SAME VIEW OF THINGS AS US.**

56. 09 Feb 94

**At 12.00 hours meeting at the ambassador's in order to agree on the attitude to adopt at the meeting this evening. He considers that we should retain firm language recalling the obligations of all parties within the context of the ARUSHA agreements and that the act of attacking the Belgians is, by calculation, contrary to the spirit of ARUSHA. 16.00 hours call to JS at his request. He wishes to know if the request of FC to be able to conduct offensive actions should be supported. I replied to him in the affirmative.**

Very agreeable evening, the aim sought by JS FAR was achieved, both parties had the opportunity to highlight their concerns, namely for us the disinformation campaign conducted by RTLM and for them above all to draw our attention to the psychological preparation of the next detachment.

57. 10 Feb 94

14.30 hours FC meeting CC9 namely FC, DFC, G3 and the Sector Comd, MILOB, DMZ. The aim is to have a rundown of the situation. In fact, the PL has still not settled its internal problem and therefore, still has no solution in view. Unless the other parties decide to push the PL aside. However, here this changes the political relationship within the meeting in which the Presidential circle of influence would come out of it stronger. Therefore, there is still a political impasse. FC also wants to analyse and plan the possible actions because at the end of the month the Mil/Gd and officials will not be paid and for the FPR there will be Appro C1 I problems. We find ourselves in a situation where we do not know what action to take what time limit to fix. Should the FPR be returned to the north, but will it want to go back? This is not certain. Compensation in this eventuality? If we fix a limit what do we do if this is not observed? Do we fix a new one or do we leave? **If the current situation persists unrest will probably increase again. Compensation for our security?** In short we are worried. The CS of the UN should vote tonight on a resolution for RWANDA.

I would not like to be in FC's position. The failure of the mission is not an easy thing to come to terms with, if this happens.

58. 11 Feb 94

14.00 hours RGF-RPF meeting regarding the changes that should be made to the KWSA procedure. As usual these are discussions when we no longer know what to do, in one direction, the FPR disputing everything even the good faith of the UNAMIR.



59. 12 Feb 94

11.00 hours meeting FHQ intended to recall the measures anticipated in the event of the BBTG MEP. All measures must be taken for a ceremony on Monday 14 Feb at 10.00 hours with MEP arranged for 06.00 hours

**TWO ELEMENTS HAVE CHANGED FROM THE LAST TIME THE TUNISIAN DET REPLACED THE RUTBAT ELEMENT, THE RUBAT QRT HAS ITS APC, BUT NOT YET OPERATIONAL.**

60. 13 Feb 94

PM the continuation of the political meeting took place chaired by the SRSG. Procedural incident the meeting was scheduled for 15.00 hours but the FPR requested a postponement of 2 hours, to which the SRSG agreed. MRND and PL did not agree and did not attend at 17.00 hours with the imaginable consequences. The meeting was delayed sine die. The SRSG is accused of bias and the BBTG is put off indefinitely.

61. 16 Feb 94

We find out that the designated Prime Minister Faustin TWAGIRAMUNGU had been dismissed in the proceedings that set him against his party the MDR which had excluded him a few months before. Therefore, the court agreed with the MDR. This means that the designated Prime Minister is no longer the designated Prime Minister and that the MDR designates the new Prime Minister as ...

62. 17 Feb 94

Nothing in particular happened today. No change in the political situation.

63. 19 Feb 94

Since the morning we only talk about the MEP of the BBTG for next Tuesday. We are not too sure what this rumour is based on but everyone seems to be wholeheartedly convinced by it. Sunday quite a lot of political meetings are planned, perhaps with a view to iron out the latest obstacles.

64. 20 Feb 94

The day started with small demonstrations that were not too violent between NYARUGENGE and NYAMIRAMBO. The Gd is on the spot as well as a Det from the special Company JALI. The aim of these actions is to prevent the TWAGIRAMUNGU political meeting from being held. Within the MDR there are 3 trends, 2 opposing the third. The person concerned is in particular reproached for his heavy past and his wrangles with the law. The local population is carrying out the action in a very subtle way, without direct confrontation with the Gd. 19.30 hours official dinner given by MINAFET RW GASANA to its counterparts +/- 30 people including 3 from the FPR. In its speech MINAFET RW urges the political class to take the interest of the country into consideration before their own interests, he thanks BE for its participation in the UNAMIR and finally sets the date of 22 Jan and the likely date for the BBTG MEP. Everyone seems to believe this fateful date of 22 Feb. Not even the FPR expressed any counter ideas, but merely a little scepticism.

65. 21 Feb 94

21.00 hours we find out that the ceremony will take place at the beginning of the afternoon. The MEP at 06.00 hours as scheduled remains in force. With effect from 23.30 hours many grenade explosions.

66. 22 Feb 94

PM we find out that the President of the CDR has been lynched in BUTARE. Immediately incidents recommence in the city, very violent with grenades being thrown. At about 17.30 hours I receive the document from the Prefecture with the directives relating to the curfew from 19.00 hours to 09.00 hours. At about 20.00 hours I find out that the BBTG is scheduled for tomorrow at 10.00 hours.  
22.00 hours once again many grenade explosions.

67. 23 Feb 94

06.00 hours arrangements in place for BBTG. No fog in the morning or any demonstrators. The city is quite calm with a few incidents to be reported but nothing dramatic. It quickly emerges that the ceremony will not take place at 10.00 hours.

09.00 hours FAR meeting - Gd for modification of the KWSA SOP.

12.00 hours information has been forwarded that the ceremony will in fact take place at 14.00 hours.

14.00 hours everything is in place for the ceremony, the President is present, but neither the Prime Minister nor the designated Prime Minister nor the FPR were present. Consequently the implementation came to a sudden end and after a few minutes all the participants went home. Incidents that were ethnic by nature were reported throughout the day. Fear is increasingly noticeable in the population. Requests for assistance are also increasingly numerous.

68. 24 Feb 94

Burial of the Minister GATABASI in BUTARE. The UNAMIR participated in the organisation of the convoy by providing general security. **07.30 HOURS START UP OF 6 RUTBAT APC'S THAT OPEN UP THE ROUTE THAT IS COMPLETELY CLEAR. THIS MOVEMENT WAS PRECEDED BY A HELI RECCE AND I PRECEDED THE APC'S UP TO THE BOUNDARY OF THE KWSA. EVERYTHING WAS CALM.**

The FC also reported to me that the President had said to the SRSG that the FPR was going out during the night to go and arm the people of TREMERA. **I ASKED THE RUTBAT NIGHT PATROL TO PAY PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO ANY ABNORMAL MOVEMENTS.**

69. 25 Feb 94

During the evening once again many people came to seek protection from the UNAMIR. ONCE AGAIN AT MOCTAR AND AT RUTBAT. I spoke about this with FC and we decided not to admit people into the interior of our installation but to provide them with protection outside.

70. 26 Feb 94

The aim of this transfer of troops is twofold on one hand to make it possible to have a more effective presence in the KWSA and on the other hand to exert pressure on the President by withdrawing troops from DMZ, which would make action by the FPR more plausible.

71. 27 Feb 94

End of the afternoon a UNAMIR minibus was fired on near DON BOSCO. No one was wounded.

72. 28 Feb 94

Departure in the afternoon of all the FPR VIP's to MULINDI. They went away in consultation and to adopt a strategy faced with the events of the last few days, among others the political plans of the presidential circle of influence. According to information a new list of ministers and deputies has been drawn up. Will it meet with the approval of the FPR. **If so, the BBTG may be put in place very quickly, if not it is likely that we are heading towards confrontation. This scenario is nonetheless feared by many because in the 3 largest camps of the KIGALI garrison (KALI, KANOMBE, KIMIMURURA) the personnel are digging new defensive positions and are restoring the old ones.**

73. 02 Mar 94

PM security meeting at the Prefecture with the Prefet, Sub-Prefet, Magistrate of the 3 communes of the PVK (KACYIRU, KICURO, NYARUGENGE) in order to talk about the events of the past week and to draw lessons from it and to establish concrete measures. The assessment is relatively positive and I think that some sort of meeting is necessary if only to allow the local authorities to express their concerns, problems, wishes as well as **to set the record straight regarding various rumours circulating with regard to the UNAMIR.**

74. 04 Mar 94

**THIS MORNING A COORDINATION MEETING AT THE EMBASSY FOR THE MDB VISIT AND THE REHEARSAL BY RUTBAT OF A DEMONSTRATION TO DISMANTLE A ROAD BLOCK AND THE PROTECTION OF VIPS WITH APC, NOT VERY CONVINCING.**

At the end of the afternoon 4 men from the 21 Company, completely mad, broke into the hotel 1000 Collines. RTLH had already reported their exploits in town a long time before we were informed. Long live our reputation.

From a political point of view it is dead calm. I am not aware of how the political situation is developing, if it is developing or the point of view of the FPR regarding the modification made to the PL and to the MDR.

75. 05 Mar 94

*This morning I must see the FC for various problems requiring his decision or advice among others on the accommodation of the 2 Officers that I am welcoming as support, THE LEAVE THAT SOME RUTBAT SOLDIERS WANT TO TAKE TO GO TO MECCA AND WHICH EXCEEDS THE PERMITTED 21 DAYS, VISIT OF THE MDN.*

**11.00 HOURS I ONCE AGAIN ATTEND THE RUTBAT REHEARSAL, A LITTLE BETTER THAN YESTERDAY BUT LACKING REALISM COMPARED WITH THE SITUATION THAT WE HAVE EXPERIENCED DURING THE LATEST EVENTS.**

A further incident with the soldiers of 1 Para during the afternoon. These soldiers are on leave whereas the Bn no longer advises anyone in this situation and furthermore they were on an outing when this was prohibited. Obviously I was very disappointed with the 1 Para who gave me the impression they were a Bn that was not being commanded.

76. 08 Mar 94

**11.30 HOURS REHEARSAL/DEMONSTRATION BY RUTBAT ON THE USE OF APC'S IN FRAUGHT SITUATIONS.**

**16.30 HOURS COORINDATION MEETING KIBAT.**

**18.00 HOURS RUTBAT INVITATION TO THE RHAMADAN "BREAKING FAST".**

77. 09 Mar 94

*The political contact continues, but without being able to establish the direction that they are taking.*

*The UN has fixed a new deadline for a significant change, this is on 05 Apr, the date on which a further report should be submitted to the CS which must elect a new Bg.*

78. 10 Mar 94

*The aerodrome monitor team confirmed to me that the munitions are located near to the AA canons and that one item is pointing towards the CND.*

79. 11 March 94

*Unfortunately the insistence of the MDN of repeating that the transition institutions ought to be put in place rings a little false.*

80. 14 Mar 94

**The situation is still quite calm, despite the fact that politically, nothing has improved. We are living in a slightly surreal atmosphere. Everything is calm, everything seems idyllic, even though all the problems that caused the unrest at the end of February are still present.**

81. 16 Mar 94

*This morning we found out about the murder of 5 people in KINIMIRA IN DMZ. These were the Director of the tea factory (son-in-law of the Private Secretary of President PEPO - Enock RUMIGIRA), his wife, an engineer and two employees. They were killed yesterday a little before 18.00 hours by AK47 and grenade. One of the victims is from the PL, MUGENZI tendency.*

82. 17 Mar 94

*10.00 hours political meeting organised at the Sector HQ. The Tanzanian facilitator convened a broad meeting of all the parties and of the BE - FR - US - GE ambassadors.*

83. 18 Mar 94

On the radio news at 08.00 hours the designated Prime Minister announced the MEP of the BBTG NLT next Monday. DFC decided to move to YELLOW stage as a precautionary measure.

84. 19 Mar 94

Everything is calm this morning in town. Does this mean that all the parties agree with what the designated Prime Minister intends to do? We will find out in future.

15.30 hours discussion with the Ambassador about the security case - evacuation of the expatriates.

20.00 hours last briefing of André LEROY to whom I hand a crest for the Bn. My feeling are, despite everything, mixed, I am not especially pleased with the general behaviour of the 1 Para. It leaves a negative assessment which is going to handicap the action of the 2 Cdo which it cannot afford. **We are obviously a target and will remain so for a long time yet.**

85. 20 Mar 94

No follow-up of yesterday's attack.

86. 21 Mar 94

The problem that concerns us is that of order and security. With G3 we are coordinating our action in order to be able to face a disturbed situation tomorrow.

87. 22 Mar 94

During the evening meal Enock who was at a reception in the next door room came to say good evening to me and to tell me that the transition government would be put in place this Friday and that there will be no demonstration tomorrow or the day after.

88. 23 Mar 94

The MEP of the BBTG for Friday seems to be verified as the FPR have not issued (apparently) any objection. The MDN has confirmed to me that this will take place and that even he recognises that the MRND had slowed the process down until now.

During the morning the Bn Comd (ai) of the GP came to coordinate the security aspects of the MEP.

PM Preparation for the briefing tomorrow with the French. This is the UN evacuation plan - expatriates.

No information regarding the possible demonstrations for tomorrow has reached us from the Gd. The Patrol rule from 05.00 07.00 has been maintained just in case. **Rumours are circulating that tomorrow the interior of the country will be paralysed by actions that may be violent.**

89. 24 Mar 94

The MEP of the BBTG seems to be confirmed. At the beginning of the morning the MINAFET Mr. GAZANA came to talk to me about certain political considerations and confirmed to me that he was going to the Prime Minister in order to finalise tomorrow's ceremony.

10.30 hours Briefing on the Evacuation plan aimed above all at the French who have (apparently) a few concerns about the capacity of the UNAMIR to suitably and professionally deal with the evacuation of their nationals.

18.00 hours FHQ Briefing for tomorrow's ceremony. Even though at the same time political negotiations were still being held to smooth over the latest PL and MDR's problems.

90. 25 Mar 94

Historic and key day, but also will all the dangers and all the uncertainties. Will it really happen? Will the BBTG finally be put in place?

12.00 hours still nothing. The President had come to the CND, also the members of parliament and the Diplomatic corps, but not the FPR. In fact today's lists are not the same as yesterday's and the political discussions continue in order to settle the disagreements.

While waiting the upper echelons of the FPR remained on stand by in MULINDI. I found out that the problem is of a political nature because the list presented the day before by the Prime Minister was not the same as the one presented this morning. This difference manifests itself with the CDR and has required negotiations between CDR - FPR, but without results.

19.00 hours we move to green stage, the ceremony will not take place tomorrow either. Disappointment. What will the consequences be?

91. 26 Mar 94

Calm day. Nothing wonderful. Nothing political has filtered down.

92. 27 Mar 94

Very calm day. Without anything improving the political situation. In fact no real negotiation has been undertaken between the FPR and the CDR. Furthermore, the Vice Chairman has returned to MULINDI. Therefore, there is no MEP of the BBTG this Monday.

93. 28 Mar 94

05.30 hours Telephone call from the DFC explaining to me that at the request of the SRSG he requests the BBTG MEP is scheduled for 08.00 hours. The SRSG does not want the UNAMIR not to be ready to play its part if there is a breakthrough in the political negotiations.

08.00 hours the plan is in place, but it very soon appears that the invitation by the Prime Minister was a personal initiative.

At 08.20 our LO Gd came to inform me that the Gd was removing its plan, meaning that the MDN would no longer support what happened at the CND.

94. 29 Mar 94

The political log jam between the CDR and FPR persists. No flexibility has been observed. Although the diplomatic world leans strongly towards the CDR participating in the transition institutions, even if it is subsequently excluded if it does not observe democratic behaviour. While waiting nothing is progressing and the date of 05 Apr is rapidly approaching.

95. 30 Mar 94

From there I left to go to the Head of EM FAR with whom I had a very long discussion regarding the current political situation and its possible consequences with regard to the possible attitude of the FPR. The Gen was very pessimistic and feared the military action of the FPR. He requested that we are very attentive at the CND with regard to the nocturnal sorties of the FPR.

96. 31 Mar 94

12.00 meal with Head EM Gd and André VINCENT at the CTM. The Gen wanted to thank us for having organised his trip that was very fruitful. This meeting enabled us to have an exchange of ideas on the political situation and regarding the hazards of the future. The Gen was worried about the possible intentions of the FPR to use the transition bodies to modify the peace agreements to its advantage.

97. 02 Apr 94

Long discussion with FC following his return. We discussed various points including the reorientation of our actions on the ground so as to better respond to the expectations of the population. I also spoke to him about the restructuring of the (BE) Det which consisted of making the Bn more independent administratively from the Sector Comd. FC promised to have a word with JS. He asked me to send him two documents. The 1st about the conclusions drawn from the security meetings at the PVK, conclusions that influence our commitment on the ground for the Patrols and search operations. **THE 2D ON THE RUTBAT LIMITATION OPERATIONS.**

98. 04 Apr 94

4 months of being in RWANDA. How many more?

This Easter Monday is essentially devoted to the drafting of a document for the attention of JS (6 pages) relating to my findings and my suggestions with regard to the general organisation of the BE UNAMIR Det. I have drawn inspiration for this document from the experiences with KIBAT 1 and it is intended to express my point of view before a decision about the UNAMIR Det organisation arrives from Brussels. This new conception copied from the ERDUT one will be the consequence of the debriefing given by GSX and JP ROMAN following their visit in February.

17.00 hours reception given by the Senegalese for their national celebration. A great success, warm atmosphere. I had my meal with the FC, Mr. KAWÉ and Col BAGOSORA and his wife. Interesting discussion regarding the political situation in Rwanda and regarding the importance of the ethnic groups in the relations between the communities. In fact, the theory supported is that the only motivation for the FPR to take up arms against the current government is not victory over democracy but the defeat of power by violence. I am quite prepared to share this theory which seems to me to be consistent with my observations and deductions.

99. 05 Apr 94

The political party of the UNAMIR seems to be taking the initiative in this current stalemate situation. An important meeting should try to find possible solutions for the FPR CDR problem. The UN CS commits itself to a 6-month extension of the UNAMIR mandate with a serious assessment after two months, i.e. at the beginning of June.

EM Head decided on a new cordon and search operation for next Thursday. Our participation will be the same as last week. He also insists that we continue the night CP. This activity seems to be very well received by the population. **However, the security conditions in which these CP are carried out do not exactly thrill me.**

This morning I sent a 6-page handwritten document to JS in which I explain my experiences of the preceding 4 months. I hope that he will understand the message.

Evening coordination for the MEDEVAC by C-130 of a Russian MILOB affected by malaria and hepatitis. The Evacuation procedure has not yet been completely finalised.

100. 06 Apr 94

The CS from New York voted for its resolution that is clearly more restrictive than the secretary general's suggestion: extension limited to 4 months and further review in 6 weeks. This implies of course a more rapid reply from the Rwandans.

**09.00 hours: coordination meeting at the EM Gd to prepare tomorrow's cordon and search operation. JS is present.**

10.00 hours: KIBAT briefing aimed at the FC. Very good two-hour meeting before going to Don Bosco for the second meal. FC has the opportunity to set out his philosophy regarding the way to work in our zone. KIBAT definitely must have realised that there is no difference of opinion between the FC and myself.

**11.00 hours: movement to KAMI camp to inspect the camp and then patrol in the zone. Several FAR positions, even without application of the KWSA.**

12.00 hours: I sent a copy of my letter to JS to Baudoin Briot.

**20.30 hours: big explosions heard in Kanombe, initially we thought they were artillery fire on the airport. In fact, we found out a short time afterwards that President's aeroplane returning from a meeting in Zaïre, had been shot down by two missiles. In addition to the President of Rwanda and two of his Ministers, General Major NSABIMANA, Col SAGATWA, Doctor AKIWGEMEYE also died. This is how a very long night began full of uncertainties about the way in which the situation would develop. The crisis meeting at the army EM. The MDN is travelling to Cameroon.**

**JS Gd is the highest military rank present and chairs the meeting.** The atmosphere is tragic, everyone clearly realises the consequences of this attack. The town is calm during the night. However, we sense agitation at the barricades. With regard to the firing on the presidential aircraft, a section of guards in Rutongo reported that they had seen two balls of fire going up towards the sky. A short while afterwards, Doctor PASUCK reported that the aeroplane had crashed near to his house. A little while afterwards, a soldier from Kanombe informed KIBAT of the identity of the PAPS of the aeroplane.

101. 07 Apr 94

**Quiet night. At about 05.30 hours a radio announcement announced the tragedy of the night before. This triggered a fury of firing of guns and automatic weapons in all the camps. After this the shooting did not stop again all day.**

The Prime Minister tried to go to Radio RWANDA but she could not reach the building. Our forces also lost their freedom of movement. The crossroads were occupied and the GP, FAR, Gd units prevented passage.

Despite our willingness to place the maximum number of people on patrol this night, the Gd did not respond with the same speed or intensity as us. Some of the Ground Company refused to go out. The FC insisted that we sent a patrol to KANOMBE in order to monitor the crash site and commence an inquiry. The RGF authorities promised their assistance, but no LO was sent to us to enter into the camp. All attempts to enter failed.

05.15 - 05.30 hours. Widespread shooting

05.25 hours K1 (DE LOECKER) blocked at the Crossroads N/S route

05.36 QRT on alert

07.00 AA units remove the munitions to KIA

07.15 Visit of the LtCol Gd Security Company (LtCol BAVUGAMENSI) reports that 2P1 GP are murdering the opponents.

09.30 hours 3 RUTBAT APCs blocked by Gd who threaten to open fire if the APCs advance.

08.40 hours Agathe takes flight our men do not know how to follow her. They are taken and disarmed by the GP then taken to the KIGALI camp.

09.40 hours FC reports that the ROE's have not been changed. Some Tutsis have very probably been killed by the GP. The expatriates in KIMIMURA have not been disturbed.

12.00 hours FC/MA reports that the Milob who was with the 13 prisoners of the P1 Mor from KIBAT (in fact LO + 5 Ghanaians) reported that 2 or 3 had definitely been shot and probably 11). All afternoon the shooting continued + various explosions.

16.00 hours after threats by Gen Maj KAGAME via Company FPR left the CND and violently attacked the Bn GP. Violent fighting continued until nightfall.

Several times shooting took place very close to the HQ and mortar fire tell close.

19.00 hours further violent attack close to Elisabeth's. Automatic weapons, Mortar...In short the big show.

PM also alarming, worrying moments during which about 15?? Chaps were surrounded for more than 40 min by an angry crowd. In the end they got away by opening fire. One RW dead and a few injured...