that reminds me a very interesting quiz.
5个海盗抢到了100颗质地完全一样的钻石,但又不愿意平分,最后5个人同意抓阄解决:按照1,2,3,4,5的抓阄结果,将5个人编号。抓到1的是1号,抓到2的是2号,依次类推。现由抓到“1”的1号海盗提出分配方案,为了防止他分配不公,海盗们达成一致:他的方案必须有所有人(包括1号自己)的半数以上(注意,必须大于50%)通过才可执行。否则,他将被杀死,再由2号海盗提出分配方案,2号的方案也要所有剩下的人(包括他自己)的半数以上通过。否则他也将被杀死,依次类推。假设这5个海盗都贪婪成性、残忍无比、绝顶聪明而又一诺千金,都想自己得到最多,都想看到别人死去而自己活。请问,1号要怎样分配才能使自己得到的钻石最多?
another version is >=50%
I remembered I've seen this problem before. However I didn't understand and thus didn't remember anything about the answer. So I'll try my best here.
Let them be called A, B, C, D, E.
For anyone who has the chance to divide, he himself must agree on his own proposal, he just please the rest such that the agreed proportion > 50%. E will not die in any case, so he probably will accept whenever the offer is >0, D will die hard if he's going to make a proposal. (because E will surely banned him). And I think this is important, because he will try to make A-C's proposal successful. So, D will always vote a YES to A,B,C's proposal to avoid dying.
If C is going to make a proposal: He just need to have most for himself, 0 to D, 0 to E. because D will vote YES to him to avoid D proposes, C doesn't needed to please D. i.e. C:100 D:0 E:0
[in this case C vote YES, D vote YES, E not important]
If B is going to make a proposal: He just needed to proposed a better-than-C proposal. Because D will vote YES for sure. And he just needed to issue some small amt to E and E will vote a YES. He will probably propose this : B:(100-y-x) C:0 D:x>0 E:y>0
[in this case B vote YES, C vote NO, D vote YES(better than nothing), E vote YES(this is better than nothing)]
Seeing this, A needed to proposes a better-than-B proposal. A's proposal should be :
A: 96
B: 0
C: 0
D: z=2 > x
E: u=2 > y
Is that the case?
[I modified it 4 times already...hehe ]